

# Strategic Collaboration: Brazil, China, India, Russia, and the United States (U.S)

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## Abstract

Russia and China are aiming to challenge US hegemony and gain influence in previously US-dominated countries. One of these countries is Brazil. Historically, Brazil and the United States shared both countries rely heavily on stable partnerships. Russian and Chinese influence in Brazil could alter Brazilian aims and impact relations with the United States. This may have an impact on US interests in Brazil. The paper examines the impact of Russian and Chinese influence in Brazil on US national interests through diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means. The conclusion Russia is fanning tensions in Latin America, while China promotes economic competition with the US in the region. Both measures have implications for US interests in Brazil.

**Keywords:** Brazil & United States, Brazil & Russia, Russia's informational sway over US interests in Brazil: implications, Russia's military influence and the implications for US interests in Brazil, Russia's Economic Power and the Implications for American Interests in Brazil, Russia's Influence and the Implications for American Interests in Brazil, Brazil & China: China's Diplomatic Influence and Its Effects on American Interests in Brazil, China's Informal Influence and the Implications for American Interests in Brazil, 13. China's Military Presence and Its Effects on American Interests in Brazil, the Economic Impact of China and Its Repercussions for American Interests in Brazil.

## Introduction

Following WWII, the US became the dominant global power, establishing an "international order that suited its interests." [1] Aside from that, the world has watched China's expanding economy since 1978, and its relevance is growing at an unprecedented rate. [2] Russia's emergence as a geopolitical competitor in Latin America jeopardizes US interests and undermines alliances. [3] Russia and China are competing

for influence in Latin American countries, with differing agendas. Several countries, particularly Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), have initiated initiatives to achieve a shared agenda.[4] Jim O'Neill, Goldman Sachs' top economist, invented the phrase in 2001. Initially, it merely referred to four countries having robust economies that are worth investing in. [5] In 2008, the association adopted a flexible structure and a common agenda, which included annual meetings.[6] According to the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, BRICS initiatives now include political coordination as well as economic, financial, and multisectoral cooperation.[7]

BRICS should be scrutinized not only for its stated goal but also for the member countries' deliberate attitudes. Russia and China present themselves as Potential partner for Latin American countries. This is an "example of what might be an effort to form a strategic balance against the United States." [8]

Brazil is seen as a "regional power and an important leader in international affairs." [9] The country has the tenth highest GDP (based on purchasing power parity estimates from 2017). In compared to the rest of the world, it has the fifth most people (as of July 2017), the sixth largest area, and a plethora of natural resources.[10] According to Gvosdev and Marsh, Brazil is a rising global power, and its relationship with Russia is a major priority for all levels of government.[11] Ellis believes Brazil has a solid position among China's. Several experts, like Monica Hirst, have pushed China to accept Brazil's traditional leadership role in Latin America.[12]

According to Hirst, the United States no longer has a significant role in Brazilian foreign policy.[13] This information is critical as experts assess the connection between Russia and China. Brazil has the potential to undermine American interests.

## **Problem Statement**

Russia and China's expanding influence in Brazil raises concerns about their possible impact on US national interests. Russia and China are expanding their worldwide influence. These countries threaten the United States' global leadership. As part of the process, as their influence grows, they are turning their attention to Latin American countries, particularly Brazil. Brazilian diplomacy prioritizes multilateralism and sees potential in the new Russia-China partnership.[14] This begs the question of how it will affect Brazilian-American relations.

## **Overview of the Study**

This paper looks at the consequences of Russia and China's expanding influence in Brazil for US interests. It provides a theoretical framework for verification. I will provide appropriate books on the subject. This study gives theoretical support for the goals of Russian and Chinese influence in Brazil. Authors and Official Documents from Brazilian, Russian, and Chinese officials see Russia's presence in Latin America as a danger to regional stability. The Chinese seek to undercut US influence in the region, forcing Americans to compete directly with them in a historically dominating zone influence. The goal is to reduce US influence in Russia and China's critical territories in Eastern Europe and the South China Sea. The paper's format will assist in addressing primary and secondary research issues about Russian and Chinese DIME influence. The literature review will focus on new materials that support or refute existing expert analysis and results on the subject. It Attempts to provide a Brazilian viewpoint on the subject.

The conclusion will discuss the Russian and Chinese DIME effects in Brazil, which may have implications for US national interests there.

## **Literature Review**

Brazil-Russia and Brazil-China established bilateral relations in 1878 and 1974, respectively. Since 2000, these countries' foreign ministries have reported an increase in high-level visits. Increased activity prompted the establishment of appropriate bilateral agreements in succeeding years.[15] Gvosdev and Marsh stated that Russia's foreign policy aims to form a coalition with different countries to counterbalance the influence of the U.S., Europe, and China. The authors consider BRICS as a potential new international alignment to place Russia in an advantageous position as coordinator and mediator of a multipolar world. [16] Blank stated that Russia considers Brazil the future leader of Latin America and intends to strengthen its influence in the region by establishing connections with Brazil and posing a competitive challenge to the United States. Blank also said that Russia utilizes the BRICS to promote multipolarity in the world.[17]

Milles considers that Russian engagement in Latin America includes trade and investment, diplomatic engagement, and arms sales. The diplomatic approach seems to be more critical than the economic or military approaches. Russian intent is to destabilize democratic institutions in Latin America and use the region to divert attention from the critical situation in Georgia and Ukraine. [18]

Chinese interest in Latin America aims to guarantee access to essential commodities and they finance the development of the local economy. Ellis defined China's intent to increase its presence in Latin America as a long-term strategic objective, which will have implications for the United States. The author described that the Chinese approach to Latin America aims to balance the influence of the United States in Asia. [19] Piccone defined that China increased its diplomatic approach with Latin America, facilitated by the leftist governments which were the majority in Latin America during the last decade. The author highlighted that the government of China published 2008 China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, to clarify Chinese priorities for the region. [20]

Fleischman, overall, has the same opinion as Ellis and Piccone. The author further highlighted that China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean gives normal protocols on the issues from an economic perspective, but has a strategic dimension that can be understood by examining the Chinese political and military goals.[21] Brazil's influence in international multilateral arenas was to be increased through stronger ties with other developing nations and regional powers, such as China and BRICS; Pereira and Neves identified this as occurring at the same time as the adoption of the South-South foundations for Brazilian foreign policy, which were adopted during President Lula's administrations (2003–2010). [22]

## **Literature Review: Brazilian Information Influence of Chinese and Russian**

According to Blank, Latin America might become unstable as a result of Russia's military and intelligence backing for Venezuela's regime. In the past, Russian influence was introduced into the region due to U.S. policy's carelessness. [23]

According to Milles, Russia's only meaningful diplomatic or business ties in the area were with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Apart from that, they don't know what they want out of Latin America. However, social media platforms that have Russian influence do so with little financial outlay. [24] According to Fleischman, the goal of Russian influence in Latin America is to demonstrate to the United States that Russia is capable of interfering in the country's borders, just as the United States has done in Russia's. [25]

Ellis asserts that Russia's primary objective in using social media is to manipulate the local populace and portray a bad picture of the United States.<sup>36</sup> Russian influence in Latin America is primarily concentrated on information operations, which complicates the US strategic position in the region. [26] Related to China, Ellis stated that the core of Chinese informational influence is related to the perception that due to the Chinese economic growth and technological development, the country constitutes business opportunities. The author also highlighted that the partnership in the aerospace arena, the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program (CBERS), supports Brazil to develop that capability but also provides “the Chinese access to Brazilian satellite tracking facilities,” with consequences for the U.S. national security. [27]

Bjorge defined that China is projecting its influence through the Confucius Institute. The author explained that the Institute is the most important and efficient Chinese informational influence tool, and has the primary objective to create favorable public opinion regarding China and the Chinese Government. The institute can influence how China is taught and studied in several Academic Institutions around the world. [28]

## **1. Brazil & United States**

U.S. Influence and the Interests Related to Brazil The influence of the US in Brazil is substantially supported by historical ties [29] and the similarity of ideals between the current governments of President Bolsonaro in Brazil and President Trump in the U.S.( The White House,2018) [30] As for diplomatic influence, Monica Hirst explained that historical links between Brazil and the United States show periods of greater and lesser proximity, but never a period of tension between the two countries. Hirst also noted that between 1942 and 1977, the diplomatic ties between the two countries allowed the United States to use its military, which was based on the Brazilian Northeast coast, to support operations in the North of Africa. During this time, Brazil also organized the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB), which left for Europe to join the US Army's 5th Division, and joined the Alliance to fight in World War II. It's amazing how the US's foreign policy priorities after 9/11 affected ties between the US and Brazil.[31] During that time, left-wing political parties came to power in Brazil, and the nation prioritized the defense of multilateralism, leading to rapprochement with nations like South Africa, India, China, and Russia. At present, there are evident indications from President Bolsonaro's administration that Brazilian foreign policy is shifting in a direction that is more in line with the United States. [32]

During that time, Brazil saw the rise of left-wing political parties and began to emphasize the value of multilateralism, leading to diplomatic rapprochements with nations like South Africa, India, China, and Russia. Brazil's foreign policy is already shifting under President Bolsonaro's direction and is now more in line with US goals. [33] However, the U.S. administration keeps an eye on Brazil and Latin America [34] to lessen the harm that would come from placing more emphasis on other regions and undermining its hegemony. This makes it clear that American dominance in Brazil and the rest of Latin America cannot continue or expand without the United States. This makes it quite clear that US participation in the area is

necessary for the nation to be able to keep or grow its influence in Brazil and throughout Latin America. It is expected that the US and Brazil's current administrations will increase their diplomatic influence on the U.S.

The informational influence provides compelling evidence that support for the United States exists. One relates to the significant influx of Brazilian immigrants into the US, indicating their cultural integration. [35] one final crucial Initiative now underway in Brazil's higher and elementary education sectors acts as a barometer.

The Brazilian government values English instruction in elementary schools. [36] This increases the efficacy of US information outreach in Brazil by promoting the adoption of American values and habits in Brazilian culture. This increases the efficacy of US information outreach in Brazil by promoting the adoption of American values and habits in Brazilian culture. When instructing college students, In response, the Science without Borders project acknowledges the goal of working with academic institutions in the United States. [37] This tactic increases American influence in science and society. The children's identification will be forged by living together, and this could potentially lead to the development of new bilateral innovations. Nevertheless, these professionals' educational backgrounds resemble those of North America when they return to Brazil and share what they have learned with all facets of Brazilian culture.

The fact that professionals with degrees from North American universities occupy the highest positions in the Brazilian government attests to the possibility of this multiplier effect. Stressing the importance of the Economy Ministers and other significant figures in the leadership of Brazilian economic institutions who, by their power and University of Chicago education, hope to force a liberal economy on Brazil. [38] Another notable person is the Minister of Science and Technology, a former Brazilian astronaut with NASA training. [39] He wants the United States to use the Brazilian rocket launch site. [40] These two examples demonstrate that the existence of Many influential leaders who received their education and training in the United States supports more American influence in Brazil. This suggests that Brazil and the United States are developing a more robust sense of scientific and cultural identity as a result of American influence there. Brazil's involvement in World War II was significant in terms of military power. "The only nation in Latin America to send troops to fight in Europe was Brazil." [41]

That had immediate ramifications in the post-war years that are being felt to this day. These effects can be observed in several domains, chief among them being the American impact on the establishment of the Brazilian War College in both the organizational structure of the Brazilian Special Forces and the architectural design of the Brazilian Army Staff College [42]

Thus, Brazilian military doctrine, organization, and even national security goals were greatly influenced by American concepts. Undoubtedly, the development of several agreements and exchanges within the weapons sector was facilitated by the ties of confidence that emerged in the European War theatre. [43] Because of this, a sizable group of Brazilian military students in numerous Regular enrollment in military courses by noncommissioned officers, lieutenants, captains, and field-grade officers enables the US to positively impact the region and achieve the IMET objectives of promoting increased defense cooperation and mutual understanding between the US and Brazil. [44] The United States' superior position within the

Brazilian Army is something that should not be disregarded. Brazilian Army's International Area Activities Guidelines (DAEBAI). As a result, that act highlights yet another area of mutual interest between Brazil and the United States and promotes the growth of military cooperation and American military power as a result. [45] The stockpile of weapons listed in the Brazilian Defence White Paper is another indicator of US military might in that country. The significant quantity of equipment indicated in Appendix A that has American origins is highly advantageous to the two countries' relationship. [46]

This illustrates both the importance of the US-Brazil commercial alliance for Brazil and the degree to which this tool of national power may be employed to further the defense of US interests in Brazil. Nevertheless, it's amazing how well any American instrument projects national power, which supports defending the nation's interests in comparison to Brazil. Within that framework, it is crucial to emphasize that the Department of State and the Department of Defence are working together to increase US influence in Brazil to protect US territory, guarantee US citizen security, uphold peace, advance US prosperity, and advance US influence. [47]

## **2. Brazil & Russia**

Russia's Diplomatic Influence and US Interests in Brazil The subsequent examination will tackle the secondary research inquiry, " Does Russia's diplomatic influence damage US national interests in Brazil? The Cold War had a direct effect on Brazil and Russia's diplomatic ties in the past. Not until 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, did more fruitful cooperation start. Things improved in 2002 when this relationship was designated as a Strategic and Technological relationship Partner. There has been a discernible increase in the number of high-ranking official visits since then. [48] two obstacles are preventing Brazil and Russia from strengthening their diplomatic ties in this area. The first of these is that Brazil is classified as belonging to the less developed segment of Russian foreign policy; this is because the two nations have no shared historical heritage. The second fact was the decline in diplomatic relations. Because of Russia's political unrest when the Soviet Union broke up and its lack of financial resources between 1991 and 2002. [49] Since 2003, there has been a discernible attempt at re-approximation. Russia has come to see Brazil as a regional leader and has a definite stake in the region, which allows it to continue challenging the United States. This reunion led to the creation of the BRICS. For this reason, the organization is an essential diplomatic weapon for strengthening a potential strategic edge over the US. [50] Noteworthy, all five of the group's nations are looking for fresh perspectives on how to restructure important international bodies like the G-20 and the United Nations. It's also critical to remember that left-wing ideological stances predominated in Brazil during the re-approximation period. Both of these Workers' Party administrations, in particular the two Lula Administrations (2003–2010) and the first term of former President Dilma Rousseff (2010–2014), maintained an external strategy that prioritized Africa, China, Russia, and the neighbors in Latin America, particularly Cuba and Venezuela, while highlighting the South-South Relationship. [51]

These relationships became much more complex after the right-wing Bolsonaro Government was recently elected in 2019. [52] There were indications of a developing rapprochement with the US even during the election campaign. The initial several months following official confirmation of this circumstance. Furthermore, take into account the deadlock in Venezuela's political system. Brazil and Russia went through a turbulent phase in their relationship that might have lasting implications because of their

differing opinions on President Guaidó's recognition. [53] Consequently, the risk associated with Russia's diplomatic influence is evaluated as probable, even though the repercussions are categorized as low.

The most plausible classification was chosen because, despite political differences among the current governments, it is widely recognized that Russia still has a diplomatic interest in attempting to reach a consensus with the Latin American nations. The USA. If given the chance, Russia will continue to want to deepen its relations with the United States since that strategy seeks to focus opposition to the United States in the region.

The decision to decrease the implications was made since it is believed that even if diplomatic contacts between the two countries grow stronger, they would still need to be maintained for a while until the growth of mutual reliance. The less severe effects can be attributed in large part to the history of US-Brazil relations, which did not exhibit tensions that would have endangered the stability of the partnership even under left-orientation regimes. The conclusion is that the US goal of growing its influence in Brazil is seriously jeopardized by Russia's diplomatic clout.

### **3. Russia's informational sway over US interests in Brazil: implications**

Will be addressed in the study that follows. Russia's primary informational leverage against US and Brazilian interests is mostly focused on its backing of Venezuela's Maduro administration. Thanks to Russian intelligence, Maduro may face repercussions in the diplomatic and military domains in addition to media manipulation. [54] Moreover, Russia conducts information operations to erode democracy in Latin America and sway public opinion worldwide, as noted in the U.S. National Security Strategy. Additionally, Russia exhibits its strength in an area of obvious consequences for the US. [55]

This kind of effect was also noticed in other Latin American nations, like Brazil, during the 2018 election season. [56] This implies that Russia intends to use this instrument there and will do so at any opportunity. Additionally, the threat and difficulties of neutralizing Russia's cyberwarfare are increased by its capacity to use social media. Additionally, the threat and difficulties of neutralizing Russia's cyberwarfare are increased by its capacity to use social media. Furthermore, remember that informational influence is a better choice for Russia, because of the noteworthy outcomes at an affordable price. [57] It is logical to conclude that writers like Ellis, Fleischman, and Blank agree that undermining US strategic dominance in the region is the main goal of this activity. [58] As a result, the danger related to Russia's information impact is assessed as high, while the repercussions are rated as moderate. The designation was probably decided because Russia used every opportunity to use its tools of media manipulation to disrupt the area. Notably, the region's volatility also encourages destabilizing impacts and Brazil, considering the circumstances in Venezuela right now. The classification of effects as moderate was chosen because informational influence may affect other domains, such as political, diplomatic, and even military ones.

Because the US is currently reducing its efforts in Brazil because it believes the region is stable, Brazil's potential destabilization presents a threat to US interests there. It is concluded that Russia's informational power poses a severe threat to the United States' objectives in preserving peace.

#### **4. Russia's military influence and the implications for US interests in Brazil**

Ionescu contends that because of their proximity and lack of conflicts of interest, Brazil and Russia could eventually benefit from a formal military alliance, even if they do not already have one. [59] When the years 2002–mid-2016 were considered, this assertion was verified. In 2002, the presidents of the two countries inked an agreement to work together on military technology. This was not how things usually work in the real-life memorandum, but one may infer that he was in favor of collaboration in the investigation into the causes of the Brazilian launch base accident at Alcântara. It's also critical to remember that Russian companies started using this platform in 2003. [60]

Then, in 2006, Brazil's lone astronaut, Marcos Pontes, launched on a space mission with Russian assistance. It should be mentioned that AEB and NASA accomplished all of the mission's planning and initial agreement. [61] Due to political obstacles and issues with the Brazilian administration of the accord, the operation was only made possible with Russian assistance. [62] As was previously said in areas of diplomacy and information, Russia must seize the chance to work militarily with Brazil. Aside from that, the acquisition of twelve MI-35 helicopters was the largest military cooperation between the two nations. The Brazilian Defence White Paper only lists only one piece of equipment as being manufactured in Russia. There is just the Igla-S mobile air defense system in place of this apparatus. [63] The fact that Russia has some influence on the military forces is addressed once more. In this context, it is agreed that Russia's military power in Brazil's right-wing governments frequently saw a far larger drop in arms sales.[64] This deterioration persisted as a result of the positions taken on opposing sides of the Venezuelan crisis.

Brazil and Russia are at odds over Russia's military and diplomatic backing of the Maduro regime in Venezuela, which is detrimental to US interests. The majority of the military hardware for Venezuela and made overt efforts to sow discord in the area. Another concerning trend is the expansion of military drills, which permits Russian strategic weapons—like the TU-60 bombers—to be stationed close to Brazilian borders and American backyards. [65] As a result, it is determined that Russian military participation poses a serious threat and that the effects will be significant. Since it was thought that Russia, like other national power tools, used its military force to disturb the region whenever it could, the most likely classification was selected. It was recognized in Brazil and continues to exist in Venezuela. It was decided to classify the repercussions as serious as one of the primary barriers to the problem's settlement is Venezuela's military support. The beginning of an armed conflict in the region could result from that military support, with unexpected and awful outcomes. It is concluded that the goals of the United States to maintain peace, safeguard the security of its population, and defend its territory are seriously jeopardized by Russia's military influence.

#### **5. Russia's Economic Power and the Implications for American Interests in Brazil**

"Does Russia's economic influence pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?" is the secondary research topic that will be addressed in the study that follows. Brazil and Russia do not have a strong economic relationship. When considering the entirety of trade between the two nations, it makes up only 1.3% of Brazil's total and barely 2% of Russia's. [66] This profile also proved that even after ten years of existence, the BRICS economic grouping has not accomplished anything, at least not from



Russia's point of view. The main product that Russia imports from Brazil is frozen cow meat. Despite being Brazil's largest economic partner, overall trade is not very important between the two countries.[67] Russia's scant contribution to the top five Brazilian exports further bolsters the low visibility of trade between the two countries. [68]

In contrast, less than 1% of Russian investment is made in Brazil; this is much truer when considering Brazil's perspective. There is no mention of Russia in the official report on foreign investment. [69] As such, the impact of Russia's economic influence is regarded as minimal, and the risk that goes along with it is deemed extremely unlikely. It was deemed unlikely because of its minimal effect on Brazilian trade. Brazil is Russia's principal ally in Latin America, yet trade has little effect on the GDP of that nation. In the economic relationship between the two countries, neither contributes much to the economy of the other.

Therefore, it may be concluded that Russia's economic influence poses no threat to American objectives in promoting prosperity in the United States.

## **6. Russia's Influence and the Implications for American Interests in Brazil**

Russia's current foothold in Brazil suggests that it would be more interested in sowing discord than in challenging North America's hegemony in that area. Brazil and Russia have close diplomatic relations, and there is potential for future agreements between the two parties. The BRICS alliance provides a platform for states to collaborate on projects aimed at achieving shared goals. This option was restricted by the fact that the relationship grew closer in the years prior when Brazil was ruled by left-wing political parties. However, after the Bolsonaro administration came to power, this beneficial environment for Russia has changed since Brazil's recently elected president declared his intention to prioritize the U.S.-Brazil relationship over the then-current South-South policy. Add to this the current problem with the situation in Venezuela. Because of gravity and Venezuela's volatility, Brazil and Russia may soon experience a drop in their rapprochement due to their starkly opposite positions. There was no indication that bringing the two countries together was the aim of the Russian propaganda effort in Brazil. On the other hand, Russian information operations and the application of cybernetic tools are meant to deliberately undercut the democratic nations of Latin America. Thus, it is once again clear that the primary objective of Russia is to destabilize Latin America, a move that will affect US interests in Brazil and the region.

Another element in favor of the current Brazil-US strategy is the influence of the Russian military in Brazil. Nonetheless, American and Brazilian interests are impacted by Russian influence. This claim is bolstered by the reality that Russia's apparent sway stems from its backing of the Maduro government in Venezuela. The military drills and equipment deliveries to Venezuela worsen the already precarious situation in the area and promote the imbalance of power. The fact that Russia intends to do this is interesting. Beyond this, there is little military overlap between Russia and Brazil. Thus, Russian military superiority is another factor that strengthens ties between the US and Brazil, even though it impacts US interests. Regarding the nation, keeping in mind the possible risk Venezuela poses to the destabilization of the Latin American region.

The effect that has the least potential to influence American interests is the economic one in the end. Brazil is Russia's main trading partner in Latin America, although significant items and marketing principles do not affect U.S. economic ties in the region. Thus, the main way that Russian influence affects US interests

in Brazil is by pressuring the US to get more involved in issues relating to regional stability, especially what's happening in Venezuela, to defend democracy and maintain the conditions that allow both Brazil and the region to grow.

## **7. Brazil & China: China's Diplomatic Influence and Its Effects on American Interests in Brazil**

The importance of the connection between the two nations is increased by China's diplomatic influence in Brazil, which effectively coordinates national power tools. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the Chinese government has pushed for an effort to fortify diplomatic ties with Brazil.

This campaign includes several high-level visits and the release of China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Because it demonstrated China's significance for the area, the article was significant.[70]

This text is currently pertinent because it particularly outlines the nation's objectives. China also emphasized its stances on contentious issues including the Taiwan dispute. China also emphasized its stances on contentious issues including the Taiwan dispute. It is now clear that the non-diplomatic acceptance of that will be necessary to sustain relations with China area. This ban justifies coercing emerging or undeveloped nations to stick with China to protect its investments and market access—two things that are essential in today's interconnected world. [71]

Ironically, as Brazil's diplomatic relations with China were strengthening, the Brazilian government gave the South-South relationship top priority in its foreign policy. [72] Considering this, China has become a crucial ally, giving Brazil additional influence in global multilateral forums. Chinese win-win strategy was largely embodied in this partnership, which brought investments to Brazil and increased Chinese engagement in the Brazilian economy while giving China access to commodities and energy resources. [73] A new dynamic entered this relationship in 2019 with the inauguration of the Bolsonaro administration in Brazil; the full implications of this development for the diplomatic ties between the two nations remain to be seen. [74] China is undoubtedly giving priority to China is a suitable choice because of its increasing diplomatic influence and how this influence is correlated with its economic component. China has effectively opposed American influence and interests in the region by entering in this fashion. It is believed that China's diplomatic influence in this particular situation carries a significant risk. The selection of the likely classification was predicated on the observation of a persistent endeavor to enhance diplomatic relations. Additionally, China's economic might makes the above-mentioned diplomatic endeavor possible by enabling a substantial sway over issues, like as Taiwan's recognition, that ensures China's possible gain. Furthermore, in Brazil and other Latin American nations, Chinese influence is rivaling that of the United States.

The repercussions are deemed significant since other tools of national authority are becoming less rigid as a result of the diplomatic influence. Additionally, that endeavor will lessen US sway over Brazil and Latin America. Overall, From this, one could argue that the goal of boosting American wealth is impacted, with China's diplomatic influence posing a bigger danger to American interests than does American influence.

### **China's Informal Influence and the Implications for American Interests in Brazil**

China has considerable information sway over Western nations. The core of that impact is the notion that there are business prospects in China.

Due to these opportunities, more and more people worldwide are studying the Chinese language and culture to better understand how to come across as fascinating competitors or take profit from these cash opportunities. [75]

Promote Chinese ideology while jeopardizing American ideals and way of life. [76] Eleven Confucius Institutes are listed as existing throughout the world. Educational establishments in nine states. These are the principal universities in Brazil. [77] Aside from that, São Paulo, the most economically developed state in Brazil, has some public high schools that provide Chinese teaching. [78] This suggests that there was a noticeable Chinese influence. The CBERS program is another illustration of Chinese information penetration in Brazil. Thanks to the satellite initiative, Brazil was able to expand its capacity and China gained access to Brazilian tracking systems that covered the western hemisphere. [79] Because of this, the danger associated with China's information impact is assessed as probable, with significant consequences.

The probable classification was selected because of its continued prevalence and influence over the populace, as well as its narrow emphasis on financial prospects. This suggests that a smaller population is impacted by this influence than change the behavior of the broader public significantly. It's important to keep in mind, though, that initiatives typically grow larger in scope over time as a result of the success of their original efforts. An analogous evaluation can be performed using the impact on the advancement of technology. China positioned itself as a strong substitute, which helped close one knowledge gap—the creation of satellites—and encouraged the model's application in other fields. The influence on lawmakers, business owners, and college students—an important segment of Brazilian society—justifies the category of serious consequences. Members of this group will notably play significant positions in society, which may have an impact on the creation of policies, regulations, and even academic works that are relevant to the national and worldwide arena and advance the advancement of China and the US's declining sway. Thus, it is determined that China's informational sway poses a serious threat to American interests before American influence grows.

## **8. China's Military Presence and Its Effects on American Interests in Brazil**

China has less of an impact on Brazilian politics militarily than it does with other national power tools. Participating in internships and attending courses can help one gain an awareness of Brazil and China's military ties. [80]

The focus is on the likelihood that Chinese philosophy may have had a stronger influence on Brazilian philosophy, given the recent growth in interest in these activities. These discussions, however, are significantly more formal and extensive in the US.

China had a good chance to build confidence during its six years in MINUSTAH, but cooperation only happened because the mission was a UN effort rather than a bilateral agreement. [81] Another illustration of Chinese influence is the partnership between China and Brazil in the aircraft manufacturing sector. [82] This relationship is still important, but now that Boeing and EMBRAER are strengthening their alliance, it tends to have less of an impact. [83] In this particular environment, China's military influence is not

anticipated to be harmful and its effects are negligible. China was classified as unlikely because of its lack of significance. Possibilities and chances to utilize its potential. It cannot be seen wearing military gear and is limited to undergoing military training. Though the military's educational influence may eventually be able to accomplish some goals, this is not a major concern at this time.

The effects were categorized as minor because the military sector offers few avenues for influence, which means that any possible consequences for U.S. interests are contained. The primary reason for this is the massive exchange between Brazil and the United States, but it's important to recognize that China, as it has in other areas, will provide the country with its place. Nevertheless, even though military influence is extremely delicate and occasionally hard to obtain, it is determined that China's influence over the United States represents a moderate risk to American interests. Notably, close connections between the US and Brazil counterbalance China's impact.

### **The Economic Impact of China and Its Repercussions on American Interests in Brazil**

Brazil's biggest trading partner is China. [84] It is indisputable that China is important to Brazil economically. China has a greater overall economic influence than Brazil. larger than the real numbers. Several important elements are associated with China's procurement and investment policies in the sector. By playing this function, the Chinese enable the employment of other instruments of national power. Analyzing the agriculture industry shows how investment dynamics bolster China's influence in the nation. [85] Remarkably, soybeans account for 12% of Brazil's total exports, with 79 percent of those shipments going to China. The main export from the nation is soybeans. The participation **Appendix A** lists the breakdown of Brazil's exports and imports to China by value. In terms of market share, the United States is in second place with 34 percent of China's imports, while Brazil is the leading supplier with 56 percent. [86]

### *Appendix-A*

#### *China's Involvement In Brazil's Exports And Imports*

Products [87]	The product's share of the total exports [88]	China's involvement as the product's export destination
Soybeans	12%	79% [89]
Iron Ore	9.2%	53% [90]
Crude Petroleum	7.9%	43% [91]
Raw Sugar	5.2%	1.3% [92]
Cars	3.1%	0% [93]

Source: compiled by Author with data: <https://www.gov.br>

**Table 1** China's Role in Brazilian Exports: A Look at the Top 5 Products Sold in Brazil (2017).

China thereby increases its permeability in the US market and encourages direct rivalry in the sector between the US and Brazil.

China is investing in Brazilian agriculture because it wants to guarantee food security in that country. Security, and to do this, it encourages investments that focus on infrastructure gaps and span the whole production chain. It should be noted right away that China employs a win-win approach. This claim is

supported by the fact that these investments lower prices, enhance supply chain efficiency, and boost Brazil's standing as a manufacturing nation. But eventually, this investment pattern makes Brazilian companies dependent on Chinese companies. [94]

It should be mentioned that China stands to benefit greatly from this investment if the savings translate into higher profit margins and more supply chain control for the nation's businesses. The lack of appropriate identification of Chinese investments is one issue that brings attention to the issue and makes it difficult to accurately assess the influence of China on the Brazilian economy. This is what happens when investments arrive from "intermediary countries," according to the Brazilian Central Bank's definition. As a result, Chinese involvement might be far higher than recorded. [95]

Economic influence facilitates the permeability of other tools of national authority, as was previously indicated. Given the favorable economic return on China's investments, the nation's readiness to embrace these benefits will encourage the heads of state to forge diplomatic and military ties in an attempt to foster trust between them. Conversely, entrepreneurs concentrate their manufacturing on serving the Chinese market, which benefits from the backing of the largest economy globally and becomes both attractive and somewhat safe. Students and the general public are encouraged to search for possibilities through the mix of diplomatic accords and economic prospects; this system generates a positive cycle of connection growth, which shapes the good result of understanding. This system therefore provides the opportunity for economic influence, which might be followed by informational, military, or even diplomatic power. It's important to keep in mind that China now controls the majority of the market because this could increase Chinese companies' dependence on Brazil. Additionally, selling inferior natural items stunts corporate expansion and boosts earnings for Chinese enterprises. There are comparable patterns in the energy sector as well.

Crude petroleum commerce is another illustration of how China's increasing economic sway over Brazil impacts the US. These crude oil figures should be seen in the context of each nation's relative contribution to the global Brazil is a product producer. The data unequivocally demonstrates that China was successful in becoming a significant trading partner and eventually overtook the United States as the primary destination for crude oil transported from Brazil. Ellis's 2004 economic plan has once again proven to be effective. [96] China took over as the product's main market in eight years (2008–2016), dominating over 40% of Brazil's crude petroleum commerce and resulting in a direct trade dispute with the US (see **Appendix B**). As Horta argues, one could argue that economic might isn't yet translating into geopolitical influence:

## Appendix B

### Analysis of Crude Petroleum Trade: Brazil-United States and Brazil-China

**Table 2.** Analysis of Brazil-U.S. and Brazil-China Crude Petroleum Trade

	<b>Brazil-Export</b>	<b>China- Import</b>	<b>U.S Import</b>	<b>Others</b>
<b>2008-</b>	US\$ 15 B [97] 100 %	US\$ 1,7 B [98] 11,33 %	US\$ 5,44 B[99] 36,27 %	US\$ 7,86 B 52,40 %
<b>2016</b>	US\$ 9,55 B [100] 100 %	US\$ 3,99 B [101] 41,78 %	US\$ 1,48 B[102]	US\$ 4,08 B 42,72 %

			15,50 %	
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Source: compiled by author with data <https://wits.worldbank.org/>

## 9. Brazil & China: The commodities boom of the 2000s

Trade between China and Brazil increased gradually until 2000 when Brazilian foreign trade data showed that the two nations' annual trade was worth USD 2.3 billion. Known as the "commodities boom," the next 10 years saw a sharp rise in trade and investment with Chinese companies in Brazil and throughout Latin America. This resulted from the nation of Asia's growing demand for raw commodities to fuel its rapid economic expansion. China was now Brazil's principal trading partner and accounted for a large portion of the trade surplus in 2009. The yearly trade value increased to USD 56.3 billion by 2010. Latin America has welcomed the price increases in numerous items brought on by China's demand. Collaboration is beneficial for both parties, according to Raquel Patrício, an expert in Brazil-China diplomacy and professor of international relations at the University of Lisbon.

### Brazil's growing trade surplus with China

Brazil's trade with China in USD, 2000–2023




Figure:1. Data source: COMEX • Graphic: Dialogue Earth

This long-term trading tendency has resulted in a slight imbalance, nevertheless. Thais Diniz Oliveira attends Cornell University in the United States to study sustainable global trade. "We export primary products, while China exports more high-tech products to Brazil – sometimes adding value [to Brazilian products] and returning them here," she explains. According to Oliveira, the growing domestic and international demand for commodities like wheat, cattle, oil, and mining is another obstacle to Brazil's transition to renewable energy. She claims that for fragile biomes and Brazilian communities trying to preserve their traditional ways of life, it is currently too much of a burden.

China is Brazil's largest market for beef exports, while the country still produces most of its beef for the domestic market. In 2022, the global population of 203 million people was surpassed by the cow herd of Brazil, which numbered 234.4 million. The largest herds are located in communities in the Amazon or

Pantanal, such as São Félix do Xingu in the northern state of Pará and Corumbá in Mato Grosso do Sul. China accounted for 75% of Brazil's soy exports in 2023; in contrast to beef, the majority of the country's soy production was exported between 2000 and 2020. According to a 2022 study by the climate and governance research institute Plataforma CIPê in Rio de Janeiro, there may have been an increase in Amazonian deforestation caused by Brazil's increased key commodity exports to China.

"Brazil's meat production is a result of deforestation," claims Oliveira. "China is a major importer, but we can't attribute the problem of deforestation of soy and meat to it alone," the speaker stated.

In an attempt to ensure its food supply, China has made infrastructure investments in Brazil to increase commerce and agricultural output. One such project is the so-called "Fiol railway," which the state-owned enterprise China Railway is building to connect the northern Brazilian coastal city of Ilhéus to a port terminal. The project has caused controversy among the local indigenous population, who fear risks to their water sources and local fishing economy and accuse major environmental deterioration. However, Chinese businesses have already abandoned the port project.

### **2010s: A new era of climate diplomacy**

As China and Brazil's bilateral trade has expanded, so too have national and international pledges to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Eduardo Viola claims that Brazil's voluntary pledge to reduce emissions, while China "considered it unthinkable to agree to a peak in emissions," marked the "moment of great differentiation" between the two countries during the 2009 COP15 climate change summit in Copenhagen. In a statement issued in the weeks leading up to COP15, Brazil's former environment minister, Carlos Minc, voiced his discontent with China and the US, citing their unwillingness to commit to precise targets. After the difficult COP15 negotiations, neither China nor the US had put up clear targets for climate action. The BASIC bloc was established at the Copenhagen meeting by South Africa, Brazil, China, and India. Izabella Teixeira, the Brazilian Minister of Environment, described the bloc as "an important space of interlocution" after it was established (2010). This made it easier for the opinions of the two countries to align. Later, Brazil reiterated its stance and offered voluntary targets for reducing emissions, which helped to break the impasse in the negotiations. The historic Paris Agreement, which formalized the goal of lowering greenhouse gas emissions to reduce the rise in the average global temperature to 1.5C over pre-industrial levels, was agreed at the end of 2015 during COP21 in Paris. During COP21, the Chinese government demonstrated a growing commitment to advancing climate change mitigation. Santoro said that "they realized there would never be an agreement if they didn't enter into this discussion more constructively."

China also began to increase its investments in new environmentally friendly technologies. Its average annual growth in production between 2010 and 2022 was 26%, making it the world's largest producer and consumer of renewable energy at the moment. These days, China plays a significant role in global supply chains for a range of low-carbon technologies, including solar panels, wind turbines, lithium batteries, and electric vehicles. Santoro stated that "China has emerged as a technological and scientific leader in the decarbonization process, with Brazil trailing behind."

### **2020s: Is it feasible to collaborate in new ways?**

2019 saw greater instability in the two nations' diplomatic relations when Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil's first openly anti-Chinese leader, was elected. Their heavy reliance on commerce meant that, despite repeated conflicts throughout his four-year rule, business expanded even as tensions escalated with the rise of COVID-19. The atmosphere returned to normalcy in 2023 after Lula took office again as president of Brazil. His administration has attempted to recover from the environmental catastrophes of the Bolsonaro years and accomplish a more sustainable reindustrialization in addition to pushing the country's energy transition.

Within this framework, there are now greater prospects for cooperation. "China can enter Brazil through direct investment or technology transfer, as the government has prioritized sustainability," says researcher João Cumarú of O Plataforma CIPÑ. According to Cumarú, there are four particularly promising areas for climate cooperation: stepping up climate policy cooperation; promoting greater Chinese participation in Brazilian energy policy; incorporating Chinese forestry experience and policy approaches to recover degraded areas; and strengthening conservation policies for biodiversity.

Cumarú recommends that China emulate the European Union and demand cleaner supply chains for its imports. The South American agriculture sector is opposed to the European Union's recent legislation that forbids purchasing products connected to deforestation and violations of human rights. Even so, Cumarú acknowledges that such measures would violate China's established foreign policy, stating that "China is prevented from making this demand - unlike the European Union, which does so directly - by its diplomatic practice of non-interference." Professor of international relations at São Paulo's Federal University of ABC Ana Tereza Lopes Marra de Sousa said that, from a geopolitical perspective, China "wants to build a multipolar world, and a strong Brazil is in its interest."

The Brazilian government, according to Marra de Sousa, wants China to transfer more green technology to Brazil, but she also points out that Chinese companies might not be eager to part with such assets. Consequently, she is in favor of collaborative technological advancement, emulating the pioneering satellite programs of the two countries. A 1988 agreement between Brazil and China made possible one of the longest-running bilateral cooperation initiatives in the world: the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), which monitors the Amazon. Since then, six satellites have been launched; two are still in operation. The anticipated USD 100 million cost of the seventh, CBERS-6, is scheduled for launch in 2028 and will be split equally by the two nations. The CBERS program was initially intended to facilitate scientific knowledge exchange, but it ultimately proved to be crucial in the fight against the deforestation of Brazilian biomes. Santoro said that "it's a groundbreaking program that remains a key model for scientific and technological development between countries of the global south."

## Conclusion

In conclusion China's and Russia's DIME instruments of national power and their implications for the U.S. interests in Brazil, as well as the U.S. DIME impact and interests in Brazil. The influence of the Russian DIME was classed as having a moderate, significant, high, and low danger, respectively, for US interests related to Brazil, based on the evaluation described. As a result, the Chinese DIME was rated as having a high risk of influencing the economy, a moderate risk of influencing the military, and a high risk of influencing diplomacy and information. Having said that, it is important to keep in mind that Russia is a threat to regional stability and may have an effect on US interests, necessitating US action to maintain



stability. About China, it was apparent that the country is a potential adversary of the US in the region, seeking to weaken US influence mostly through economic strength. The dominance of North American influence on Brazil in the information sphere is still observable. This is evident in both the common cultural values and the language education provided across the nation's educational levels. It might be argued that As a result of the cultures' shared commitment to democracy and freedom as well as the striking similarities between Brazilian and American lifestyles, relationships between the two countries have significantly improved. In a similar vein, historical ties between countries allowed American doctrine to heavily influence Brazilian theory in the military domain. The quantity of North American-made equipment in the Brazilian Armed Forces is evidence of the same achievement. Authority. Stressing the IMET's enormous impact on the Brazilian military's instructional plan is equally vital. The high level of engagement of Brazilian military personnel in training and exercises with the U.S. Armed Forces will help to foster interoperability between the two nations. The amazing collaboration that developed after World War II is quite likely to maintain its current high caliber or even exceed it. About Russia's influence in It is emphasized that the political environment in Latin America is conducive to the formation of an endeavor that unites Brazil, the United States, and Colombia in particular, to resolve the crisis with the least possible detrimental impact on the stability of the region. Venezuela is presently handling the situation diplomatically, but it might eventually advance militarily. However, the economic arena presents the largest challenges to successfully safeguarding US interests going forward. The US's interests in Brazil are seriously threatened by the Chinese economy's presence there. Even if you are a successful story, with North American power dwindling and Chinese influence rising. Nevertheless, considering Brazil's need to diversify its trade contacts, the United States might have a tremendous opportunity to buck this trend. Relationships between the United States and Brazil are typically upheld by shared principles, historical ties, and cultural similarities. These elements also offer opportunities to further the goals of both countries, which support the maintenance of peace and democracy throughout the American continent.

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