IJEMD-CSAI, Special Issue (2026) https://doi.org/10.54938/ijemdcsai.2026.04.2.652

International Journal of Emerging Multidisciplinaries: Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence

Research Paper

Journal Homepage: www.ojs.ijemd.com
ISSN (print): 2791-0164 ISSN (online): 2957-5036

A Quantum-Resistant Secure Communication and Key Lifecycle Framework

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Abstract

Quantum computing poses a threat to modern encryption algorithms such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) with the Shor's algorithm, cutting cracking time from millions of years to just days. Attackers commonly use an attack known as "Store Now, Decrypt Later". This form of attack banks on the future of quantum computing. Many post-quantum algorithms have been created to counteract the imminent attack should data leak. CRYSTALS-Kyber is one of the most secure post quantum algorithms that has been approved by the NIST. Using the CRYSTALS-Kyber as a base for a cryptographic scheme, a security framework can be developed with encryption and sessions in mind. Keeping virtual sessions as limited as possible reduces the number of openings an attacker may have to attempt to steal data. Despite the quantum threat, it is likely that a robust system is designed to prevent an attack from the present and a future threat. The system proposed will integrate session key managers along with strong encryption to ensure attackers cannot easily store the data now, nor will the data that they steal be easily cracked.

Keywords: post quantum cryptography, store now decrypt later, lattice-based cryptography, CRYSTALS-Kyber, key manager, secure system

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1.0 Introduction & Problem Identification

In the digital era, network security has become one of the most critical pillar for the network system by protecting all confidentiality, integrity and authenticity information that is transmitted across global network. Nearly all kinds of digital interactions relies on cryptographic protocol to protect against unauthorized access, manipulation and cracking. For instance, public key cryptography is often used in performing online payment to ensure transactions integrity and authenticity. These cryptography protocol heavily depends on mathematical problems which are unable to be solved within a reasonable time for a traditional computer.

However, due to the rapid advancement in technology, a newly developed computer – the quantum computer, has emerged which poses an unprecedented challenge toward existing security protocol. Unlike traditional computers which use binary bits (0 and 1) to process information, quantum computers operate by using qubits, which the bits itself able to exist in multiple state simultaneously and at the same time each bit is linked to the state of another bits through the principle of superposition and entanglement. Due to that reason, it allows quantum system to perform complex computation much more efficiently and faster than a classical computer.

According to the American Institute of Physics (AIP), quantum computers, especially large-scale ones have a high potential for cracking contemporary cryptographic system such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) with the Shor's algorithm [23]. Those cryptography systems form the backbone of secure communication for banking, financial, wireless system etc. This emerging threat had caused the development of Quantum-Resistant Cryptography (QRC).

1.1 What Is Quantum-Proof Cryptography

Quantum-Proof Cryptography, a new generation of cryptographic algorithm designed to remain secure even with the existence of quantum computing capabilities. Unlike traditional cryptographic algorithms which rely on mathematical problems such as Integer Factorization or Discrete Log [7]; [26] that able to be solve by Shor's or Grover's algorithms easily, Quantum-Proof Cryptography algorithm is designed with mathematical problem that both traditional and quantum computer unable to solve efficiently. Several Quantum-Proof Cryptography algorithms have been proposed, each relying on a different mathematics basis.

Lattice-based cryptography which the problem was constructed based on Learning With Error (LWE) or Shortest Vector Problem, making it difficult to decrypt by both classical and quantum system. Code-based cryptography, an algorithm that relies on the difficulty of solving or decoding a message to recover it from a random generated, scrambled set of coded data. Multivariate polynomials cryptography which secure data through the complexity of solving a series of interconnected nonlinear equations over finite fields. Hash-based signature is an algorithm that relies solely on the hash function to generate digital signature, the signature is often designed as one-time or few-time.

1.2 Why Are Current Cryptography Systems Inadequate Against Quantum Attacks?

According to a survey made by ISACA, on over 2600 global professionals in the fields of digital trust, cybersecurity, IT audit, governance and risk, the result reveals that 62% of them are worried about the rapid advancement of quantum computing may break the current internet encryption methods before quantum-resistant cryptography systems or protocols are being widely implemented, no matter in the browsers or websites [18]; [27]. This result raises a grave question, why and how these current existing cryptography systems and protocols are no longer 'safe' in the quantum computing world?

Through the year, the core concepts of current cryptography systems are based on the creation of complex mathematical problems and on the assumption that classical computers are infeasible to solve them in a practical time frame. However, the emergence of quantum computing, which utilizes quantum bits, usually referred as qubits, instead of traditional binary bits has held those assumptions no longer true. Qubits, unlike traditional bits which can only exist in either a 0 or 1 state, instead, they can occupy a special state known as superposition, in which each of them can hold both 0 and 1 states simultaneously[36]; [33]. A single traditional bit can represent only one value (0 or 1) at a time. However, a single qubit able to represent two values (0,1) simultaneously, and hence, two qubits are enough to represent 4 distinct values (00,01,10,11). When this concept relates to a simplified scenario of guessing a 4-bit number, there are 2^4 = 16 possible combinations, with classical computers, it must test all of these combinations sequentially, each with 4 bits one by one, for example, 0000, 0001, 0010, 0011 and so on, until it gets it correct. However, testing all these combinations one by one would take millions or even billions of years if the correct number is extremely large. That's what current cryptography systems assumes, and why they usually use a very large key. While with quantum computing, 4 qubits are enough to represent all the 16 combinations at once and those combinations can be processed in parallel thanks to the superposition concept in quantum theory. Besides superposition in qubits, quantum interference acts as another key factor that makes quantum computing strong enough to crack those current encryption systems. It functions as a 'filter' which ensures only the right solution/answer has a high probability to be measured, at the same time, eliminates false ones to find the correct solution much faster than classical computers. People often say that quantum computers are much faster than classical computers in solving complex mathematical problems, this is unrelated to how fast is the quantum computer's processing unit, but rather on how the data is being represented (multi-state) and how it is being processed (parallelly).

Based on these special features offered by quantum computing, various newly designed algorithms have been gradually introduced in the past recent in order to address different kind of current cryptography systems. Among these algorithms, one of the most famous ones is Shor's algorithm, which has been mainly designed for tackling 2 types of mathematical problems that form the backbone of public-key cryptography systems, that are, large integer factorization problem and discrete logarithm problem [37]; [39]. For instance, Shor's algorithm often being used to target the integer factorization problem in the RSA encryption, where its security heavily relies on the difficulty of classical computers in factorizing large numbers into their respective prime factors, N (modulus) = p (first prime factor) x q (second prime factor). In fact, this kind of task could take billions of years even using the best classical algorithm in the world, as classical computers will need to test every single possibility of combinations sequentially, and

usually, trillions of possibilities exist out there due to extremely large modulus, for example, 1024 bits. Meanwhile, by leveraging the quantum principles in Shor's algorithm such as superposition and interference properties of qubits, quantum computers able to perform computations at an exponential speed, with the intention to find the period/repeating pattern of certain modular functions which relating to the modulus [31].

Other than Shor's algorithm, there is another quantum algorithm, called as Grover's algorithm that possesses the potential to attack symmetric-key encryption systems such as AES and 3DES by finding patterns in data or breaking cryptographic keys [12]. Similar to how quantum theory applies on the Shor's algorithm, Grover's algorithm exploits superposition and interference principles to conduct accelerated brute-force search. For example, based on a blog by Cisco, it summarizes that, when considering an AES-128 key size encryption scheme, a classical computer would normally require 2^{128} attempts to sequentially gets the correct solution, however, this is considered as infeasible for a classical computer [5] ; [29]. On the contrary, through the quantum-based Grover's algorithm, these attempts can be effectively reduced from 2^{128} to 2^{64} times only, even though this amount of attempts still doesn't allow Grover's algorithm to practically 'crack' the AES-128 key, but it does actually pose a critical threat once larger-scale and more advance quantum computers being introduced [5]. In conclusion, through Grover's algorithm, the amounts of attempts/trials in guessing the correct AES key have been decreased from 2^n to roughly $2^{n/2}$, providing a quadratic speed-up on brute forcing.

1.3 Recent real-world incidents

Cloudflare

Cloudflare is a company that provides a huge range of network services to global companies to make them more secure while improving the performance and reliability of their essential internet assets. In March 2025, Cloudflare announced that they expanded end-to-end support for quantum-proof cryptography (also called post-quantum cryptography) to their Zero Trust Network Access solution. Organizations can securely route communications from web browsers to the company's web applications to get immediate, end-to-end quantum-safe connectivity. With quantum-proof cryptography joining, Cloudflare's Zero Trust can give three benefits in the real world. First, it can protect against "harvest-now decrypt later" attacks. Some cybercriminals or hackers can capture encrypted data first and store it until they can decrypt it when better quantum computers are available. Therefore, Cloudflare can use the quantum-proof cryptography to protect customers against these future attacks and customers can direct their web traffic through Cloudflare's global network. Second, it enables company web applications with end-to-end quantum security. The internal company web applications can be directly upgraded to the entire system. There is no need to upgrade the security of every single company website so it can improve the internal security of the system. Third, Cloudflare delivers quantum safety for Internet traffic traveling to any company office, cloud environment or data center. It shows that web security, the security of cloud, equipment and data transfer between different offices are also protected by quantum-proof cryptography. This is an essential step for quantum-proof cryptographs to bring it to practice in the real world. (Cloudflare.com, 2025; [29].

iMessage

Apple announced a new quantum-proof cryptographic protocol called PQ3. It is designed for improving the security of end-to-end secure messaging and protecting communication against future attacks. With the rise of the quantum computer, classical public key cryptography such as RSA, Elliptic Curve signatures, and Diffie-Hellman key exchange will be solved by a powerful quantum computer. However, PQ3 is a messaging service to reach Level 3 security, it provides the strongest protection against quantum attacks. PQ3 used Kyber post-quantum public keys, which was selected by NIST as the Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism standard. PQ3 adopted hybrid design combined with quantum-proof cryptography and Elliptic Curve cryptography (ECC) both during the initial key created and rekeying. If attackers need to attack PQ3 security, they need to defeat classical ECC cryptography and the new post-quantum primitives. With PQ3, iMessage is still using the classical cryptographic algorithms to authenticate the sender and verify the Contact Key Verification account key. It is because these mechanisms can't be attacked by future quantum computers. Therefore, it can prevent the situation of "harvest-now decrypt later" attacks. PQ3 also has a mechanism of self-healing, it can regularly replaces the encryption key. Therefore, even if attackers stole a key, the system can automatically "self-heal," recover security for future messages. Besides that, PQ3 combines with the three ratchets to achieve quantum-proof encryption. The first ratchet is called symmetric ratchet, it can protect older messages in a conservation. The second ratchet called the ECDH ratchet, it can protect future messages by using the entropy from Elliptic Curve key agreement to update the session. The third ratchet provide post-compromise security against "harvest-now decrypt later" quantum attacks according to the ECDH-based ratchet. Overall, iMessage's PQ3 defines the most advanced technology for protecting messages against "harvest-now decrypt later" attacks and future quantum computer attacks. (Apple Security Research, 2024; [30].

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 Lattice-Based Cryptography and Kyber Algorithm

Lattice-based cryptography is one of the approaches, which favours the encryption via the use of sophisticated mathematical problems through lattice and systematic grids of points. It has been the quantum-resistant encryption of first choice as it is highly resilient to classical and quantum attack. Lattice-based algorithms are based on solving complex mathematical problems including the Learning With Errors (LWE) or Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem by comparing it with other traditional algorithms, e.g., RSA or ECC, which are based on the hardness of factorization or discrete logarithms. It is estimated that these problems are not solvable by quantum computing, even in theory [32].

The CRYSTALS-Kyber key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) first presented in the IEEE journal article "CRYSTALS - Kyber: A CCA-Secure Module-Lattice-Based KEM" (Bos et al, 2018) has resulted in one of the best quantum-safe KEM algorithms, based on lattice-based algorithms. CRYSTALS-Kyber is based on the hardness of Module-LWE and offers a good trade-off between efficiency and security. In the year 2022, The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) also chose Kyber as part of its post-quantum cryptography standardization process [6]. Though the ciphertexts are relatively small in

comparison with other candidates of the Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Kyber has one significant advantage that is it can provide very fast exchange of keys. A limitation found in real-life network setting, however, is the memory overhead and computing cost in the case of low-power IoT devices [15].

2.2 Hybrid Cryptographic Implementations

With the increasing threat of quantum computing, researchers have proposed a variety of Hybrid Cryptographic Models to achieve a secure transition between traditional encryption algorithms and post-quantum cryptographic algorithms.

According to a study by [2] in the Journal of Information and Communication Technology (JICT), By combining symmetric and asymmetric encryption techniques (e.g., combining traditional elliptic curve encryption with lattice-based post-quantum algorithms), hybrid encryption frameworks can improve the efficiency and robustness of data transmission while maintaining high security. This study points out that this kind of hybrid model can effectively enhance data confidentiality and anti-attack ability in cloud and distributed network, but it also faces some problems such as increasing computational complexity, increasing resource occupation and lack of system interoperability.

2.3 Multivariate Polynomial Cryptography

Multivariate cryptography is based on the difficulty of solving nonlinear systems of multivariate quadratic equations over finite fields, which is one of the important directions of post-quantum cryptography. As [10] pointed out in the Journal of Communications of the ACM, this type of public key cryptosystem has the advantages of fast signature generation speed and flexible implementation and is regarded as one of the potential schemes for post-quantum encryption. However, some algorithms (such as Rainbow and GeMSS) have been recently withdrawn from the NIST post-quantum cryptography competition because of algebraic vulnerabilities that can be exploited. This incident reveals an ongoing security versus efficiency trade-off problem in multivariate cryptosystems: despite their computational efficiency, their vulnerability to algebraic attacks limits their feasibility for long-term secure deployment [10].

2.4 Code-Based Cryptography

Code-based cryptography was first presented by [25]. It is based on the difficulty of decoding general linear error-correcting codes, which remains not statistically feasible for either classical or quantum computers. The McEliece cryptosystem uses a generator matrix as the public key and a highly structured private key for effective decoding. One of its main advantages is its long-term reliability; and despite having been subjected to extensive cryptanalysis, it remains virtually unbreakable over forty years later. Unlike number-theoretic systems such as RSA or ECC, no known quantum algorithm can efficiently solve its fundamental problems. However, its main disadvantage lies in its large size of public keys, which can run into megabytes based on the parameters used, making it a poor solution for devices with very limited memory or bandwidth. Recent variants like BIKE and Classic McEliece are focusing on reducing key sizes while maintaining the same security level, making them promising and hopeful candidates in NIST's post-quantum standardization process [4]; Misoczki et al., 2013). In general, in terms of its robustness and

maturity, code-based cryptography is making a strong and reliable foundation for post-quantum cryptographic systems.

2.5 Hash-Based Cryptography

Hash-based cryptography completely depends on secure hash functions rather than complex mathematical problems, providing post-quantum safety for digital signatures. Its security is built on properties like one-wayness and collision resistance, which even quantum algorithms like Grover's can only weaken multiplicatively. In fact, this limitation can be reduced by increasing the hash output length, making hash-based systems highly secure. Early developments like Lamport's one-time signature later extended to more scalable frameworks such as Merkle Signature Schemes (MSS), XMSS, and the stateless SPHINCS+ scheme. These modern versions allow multiple or unlimited secure signatures without performance degradation. While hash-based signatures may produce greater outputs and sometimes need to be carefully managed, they provide significant benefits such as simple concepts, strong theoretical guarantees, and fast verification speeds. Besides, they are independent of algebraic structures, making Besides, they are independent of algebraic structures, making them less vulnerable to unpredictable mathematical breakthroughs and ensuring thus flexibility in both classical and quantum environments [16]; [17]. For all these reasons, hash-based cryptography is considered one of the most practical and trusted post-quantum signature schemes that are currently available.

2.6 Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a way to transfer a secure key using quantum mechanics and channels that allow for transmission of photons. QKD is used to transport encryption keys for both symmetric and asymmetric ciphers. Among all the other existing protocols such as B92 and E91, they are all derived from the first protocol BB84 [19]; [20]. The BB84 protocol is based off the following 4 phases [1]:

1) Exchange of raw keys: using a quantum channel, Alice constructs a random Qubit sequence along with the measurement, this information is sent to Bob who will be unaware of measurement on each qubit. Bob will then randomly measure the state of all the qubits
2) Key Shifting: Using a classical channel, Alice and Bob will communicate their bases for measurement, a new key known as a Shifted Key is created based on the comparison between bases of Alice and Bob
3) Error Detection: Qubits may leak due to noise or the environment, but also eavesdroppers. Because of this, an error rate must be agreed upon by Alice and Bob. If the number of transmitted bits does not match the number that Bob receives by a certain margin, an eavesdropper may be within the channel and another request must be sent since the key is now unsecured.
4) Privacy Amplification: This phase eliminates any potential information that can be useful to an eavesdropper.

3.0 Proposed Secure Systems - (QRS-CKLF)

With the purposes of safeguarding modern networking environments from both current classical attacks and emerging quantum-based threats, especially 'harvest-now, decrypt-later' threats, for which promoting the concept of decrypting nowadays encrypted-traffic in the future once larger scale quantum computers are practically available, a structured and hierarchical-based secure system, namely Quantum-Resistant Secure Communication and Key Lifecycle Framework (QRS-CKLF) is discussed, proposed and conceptually designed.

3.0.1 Aim

The primary intention of designing this framework is to establish communication channels of which operate in the safe and secure network environments, where confidentiality and authenticity are kept remain even powerful quantum computers gradually exist in the future. Besides that, through implementation of structured and systematic key management mechanism, this framework is expecting to fulfill the aim to prevent any kind of 'harvest-now, decrypt-later' attacks by maintaining those keys in a short-period and well-controlled manner. Therefore, via this model, it makes the capture of the current ciphertext, or any interception of encrypted channels nowadays become less valuable to future adversaries. Moreover, ensuring that the designated system supports a smooth and effective transition for organizational cryptography system also serves as a key main goal of this project.

3.0.2 System Scope

This particular subsection is intended to define the boundaries, adopted assumptions, and intended coverage of the designed secure system. This is critically crucial, especially in designing an industry solution, as it assures the proposed design is kept realistic, practical, try-able, focused and concurrently, strictly aligned with the objectives established at the beginning of this project. The following tables list out what is included within the scope of this system (In-scope Elements) and what is not (Out-of-scope Elements):

In-scope Elements	
Designation of a secure networking communication system which specifically aims to meet post-quantum security requirements	Deployment of hybrid-enabled model, which simultaneously supports both post-quantum and classical cryptographic algorithms in a single handshaking process for transition compatibility
Adoption of several lattice-based cryptographic algorithms that can remain secure even gradual advancement of quantum concepts	Incorporation of Key Lifecycle & Trust Management mechanisms with the intent to minimize the cryptography-related exposure

Establishment of secure communication channels through designation of specialized post-quantum handshaking process	Establishment of structured processes for managing the lifecycle of cryptographic key, generally from its generation, distribution, storage until the final decomposition

Out-of-scope Elements	
No Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is embedded/adopted in the proposed secure system for figuring any anomaly, suspicious activity and abnormal traffic	Not focusing on the security considerations in Operating System (OS) patching and endpoint infrastructures
Absent of designation and implementation of post-quantum approaches that emphasizing on hardware-level/physical-level components	Absent of guidelines for organizational strategical planning, transition operation roadmaps and policy constructions and refinements
Absent of designation and implementation of post-quantum approaches that focusing on data stored on disk or any other storage media	Not targeting in designing a 'fully' new post-quantum cryptographic scheme, however, modifying on existing security frameworks

3.1 Overview of System Architecture

From a higher-level perspective, unlike conventional security solutions, QRS-CKLF is organized as layered and modular architecture which intends to equip existing network environments with capabilities in confronting against current classical attacks or even future quantum attacks without extensive redevelopment of computer applications, systems and infrastructures. In a simpler sense, this particular solution directly addresses the significant security threats that are posed by quantum-based attacks on existing network security landscapes.

Instead of adoption of a single algorithm or protocol, QRS-CKLF is structured and introduced as an integrated architecture model based upon on 2 core layers, Post-Quantum Cryptography Layer (PQCL) and Lifecycle & Trust Management Layer (LTML), which working together that aims to implement on a post-quantum enabled network gateway or server:

3.1.1 Post-Quantum Cryptography Layer (PQCL)

This layer serves as the foundational system function of the proposed framework. Just like what its name suggested, it is designed to perform all cryptographic operations in order to introduce communication channels that are quantum-resistant. For examples, it is responsible, but not limited for:

a. executing key encapsulation and decapsulation in a secure sense,
b. conducting quantum-safe handshake processes,
c. authenticating communicators' identities through quantum-proof digital signatures approach and
d. safeguarding the communication channel's session by deriving symmetric encryption keys.

In essence, the designation of this particular layer is conceptually inspired by the cryptographic core of a TLS (Transport Layer Security) handshaking process. Therefore, they share a high level of similarity but replacement of quantum-vulnerable algorithms with lattice-based problems in this layer make them differ from each other. This modification in existing security framework was also recognized and recommended by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) through public release, in which formally recognized and standardized the lattice-based algorithms as secure best alternatives for replacing classical algorithms like RSA and ECC in the future communication security protocols [6]; [21]. Besides that, probably most importantly for certain parties, this PQC Layer is designed to support the hybrid usage. Meaning that, for example, a company can still deploy this PQC capability even if there are clients or systems that have not yet fully made the transitions from the legacy system to the new one. This is mainly due to there exists some kind of flexibility where the connection can switch back to classical cryptograhic security approach when it is necessary while can offer quantum-safe channels when it can be supported [8].

3.1.2 Lifecycle & Trust Management Layer (LTML)

Built on the previous basis, while Post-Quantum Cryptography Layer (PQCL) performs necessary cryptographic operations, Lifecycle and Trust Management Layer (LTML) instead responsible on how these cryptographic-generated keys are handled and set throughout their entire lifespan. This layer is an extremely important component in the designated system as substantial risks and vulnerabilities can be introduced due to insecure handling approaches and long-term reuse of those cryptographic keys. Therefore, this layer functions as a supportive but compulsory feature for the Post-Quantum Cryptographic Layer (PQCL) by ensuring:

a. well-controlled and managed of long-term cryptographic keys,
b. secure distribution of keys via post-quantum certificates,
c. frequent rotation of keys based upon on predefined time limits and
d. well defined keys' sessions usage limit.

From the above served functionalities, it can be clearly seen that the key lifecycle and trust management mechanism introduced in this layer mainly aims to significantly decrease the long-term exposure of keys associated with encrypted traffic. It directly mitigates the negative impacts posed by future 'harvest-now, decrypt-later' attacks as keys are being managed in a way such that they remain short-lived, keep rotating and do not exist beyond their intended usage. In fact, this approach aligns with a bunch of industry recommendations, where the importance of minimizing the life of keys and reducing the value of intercepted traffic are kept emphasized as crucial key management strategies for fighting against powerful future quantum attacks (NIST, 2025) (Lena Heimberger, 2025).

3.2 Component Design

This particular section provides a detailed and component-level explanation of every single element/module (including all protocols, algorithms, approaches, techniques, configurations) that is utilized or performed in the Post-Quantum Cryptographic Layer (PQCL) and/or in the Lifecycle & Trust Management Layer (LTML), which make up the entire Quantum-Resistant Secure Communication and Key Lifecycle Framework (QRS-CKLF). While the sections above, particularly 4.1, outlined the overall system architecture from a high-level overview, this section instead focusing more on the internal design, operational responsibilities and collaboration relationship of each embedded component by in depth.

3.2.1 Post-Quantum Cryptographic Layer

In this layer, classical and traditional RSA and ECC-based cryptographic operations are being replaced by lattice-based cryptographic approaches, which are nowadays viewed as the best or the most promising algorithms in addressing quantum technologies. This apparent replacement makes this designed system easy to differentiate from other classical cryptographic solutions.

3.2.1.1 Selection of Algorithms

CRYSTALS-Kyber

In order to establish secure, simultaneously quantum-free communication channels, this layer/system is proposed to firstly adopt CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm for key encapsulation purposes. CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm is a secure lattice-based and quantum-resistant Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) for which its security foundation is relying on the difficulty/hardness, even using quantum computers, in solving the Learning-With-Errors (LWE) problem, a mathematical challenge that involves solving systems of linear equations that intentionally inserted with structured ‘noise’ or ‘obstacle’ (Pathum, 2024; [22]. For an instance, let’s consider a system of linear equations below:

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 14 & 15 & 5 & 2 \\ 13 & 14 & 14 & 6 \\ 6 & 10 & 13 & 1 \\ 10 & 4 & 12 & 16 \end{bmatrix}}_{\textbf{Matrix A}} \times \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} s_1 \\ s_2 \\ s_3 \\ s_4 \end{bmatrix}}_{\textbf{Matrix B}} = \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 262 \\ 374 \\ 258 \\ 336 \end{bmatrix}}_{\textbf{Matrix C}}$$

Figure 3.2.1. (CRYSTALS Kyber : The Key to Post-Quantum Encryption, 2024)

Each row in Matrix A represents a set of coefficient vector for forming a single linear equation. This example matrix represents a part of Learning-With-Errors (LWE) problem for which everyone, including

the attackers who attempt to intercept the communications are allowed to see these coefficient/numerical values. Matrix B represents the secret vector (secret key) with several values. This example matrix represents the secret that shared among the legitimate parties and is the target unknowns that need to solve by attackers in order to decrypt the data. Matrix C represents the result vector after conducting the calculation on each set of coefficient vector, Matrix A with the set of secret vectors, Matrix B. This example matrix will be also visible for everyone, including attackers. Below example illustrates how the above lattice-based problem is not solvable by quantum computers:

According to the above sample problem and matrix-vector multiplication theorem, the 4 linear equations can be defined as:

$$14s_1 + 15s_2 + 5s_3 + 2s_4 = 262$$

$$13s_1 + 14s_2 + 14s_3 + 6s_4 = 374$$

$$6s_1 + 10s_2 + 13s_3 + 1s_4 = 258$$

$$14s_1 + 15s_2 + 5s_3 + 2s_4 = 336$$

From the above non-noisy system of equations, it is easy for an attacker to compute out those secret values (s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4) by performing basic linear algebra theorem if they are getting to know all the values in Matrix A and Matrix C. However, with CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm adopted, it attempts to turn this 'very easy' problem into noisy (error-exist), making computers even quantum ones are infeasible to solve them. Meaning that, the attackers cannot see the perfectly correct system's picture of Matrix A x Matrix B = Matrix C, instead, what they will be shown is:

(Matrix A * Matrix B) + e (noise) = Matrix C'

Or

Matrix A * Matrix B = Matrix C + e (noise)

*Noted that usually modular arithmetic is added in the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm, also referred to as Module-LWE Kyber algorithm, to further increase the complexity of the equations (Pathum, 2024). This is due to its ability in hiding the true vector values behind the wrap-around.

As such, still using the same problem above, the equations that shown to attackers are:

$$14s_1 + 15s_2 + 5s_3 + 2s_4 = 263$$
$$13s_1 + 14s_2 + 14s_3 + 6s_4 = 372$$
$$6s_1 + 10s_2 + 13s_3 + 1s_4 = 260$$
$$14s_1 + 15s_2 + 5s_3 + 2s_4 = 333$$

Provided that $e = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ -2 \\ 2 \\ -3 \end{pmatrix}$

Apparently, the result of the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm produce a totally incorrect/misleading/fake/error-exist system of linear equations, hence the secret values calculated by attackers will be totally not matching with the right secret values set. And to add on, attackers are expected to calculate out also the noisy set's values, e, in order to get the correct secret key, but based on linear algebra law, it's not possible. This is how actually a CRYSTALS-Kyber generate an infeasible difficult mathematical problem that is lattice-based. In essence, CRYSTALS-Kyber was one of the three finalists in the NIST post-quantum cryptography project (Schwabe, 2020) and has been formally chosen and standardized by NIST as the primary choice for replacing RSA/ECC-based key exchange mechanisms (NIST, 2024; [24]. Unlike classical cryptographic approaches like RSA and ECC, which are working based on the challenge in integer factorization and discrete logarithm mathematical problems by classical computers, however, it can be broken easily using Shor's algorithm on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, while the lattice-based problems that introduced by the Kyber are so far, no known solutions by classical or even quantum technologies. This is mainly thanks to the presence of structured 'noise' in the lattice problem, making the attacker-viewable information differs from its original defined argument and causing it surely computationally infeasible to calculate the right key for a computer, even for a quantum computer, to reverse the encapsulation process and consequently, to restore the secret key.

CRYSTALS-Dilithium

While CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm is adopted to serve the key encapsulation purposes, this system incorporates CRYSTALS-Dilithium algorithm as its digital signature scheme. Similar to how the CRYSTALS-Kyber has been designed and structured, CRYSTALS-Dilithium has a lattice-based problem as its core foundation and it was, recognized by NIST, one of the leading digital signature algorithms for securing the digital world nowadays against quantum technologies. Its security is built upon the utilization of Short Integer Solution (SIS) and Learning-With-Errors (LWE) problems for which quantum computers can't solve it efficiently (Pravin, 2025; [35]. To illustrate how the underlying mathematical concepts work in Dilithium to provide secure digital signatures scheme and why it is quantum-proof, consider the sample mathematical problem below:

Suppose that the public system provides a matrix, Matrix A and a modulus, q:

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 5 \\ 7 & 4 \end{bmatrix}, \qquad q = 17$$

The key idea of a Dilithium algorithm is requiring the signer to produce/generate a short vector (signer's public key), here we called as z, that satisfies the modular equation shown below:

$$A\mathbf{z} \equiv \mathbf{t} \pmod{17}$$

Where A represents the Matrix A given by system and t represents the **public value derived from signer's public key and matrix given by public system.**

Assumes that the signer decides to use a short vector of z as shown below, the result that we can obtain by multiplying Matrix A with z is:

$$\mathbf{z} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ -1 \end{bmatrix}, \qquad A\mathbf{z} = \begin{bmatrix} 3(2) + 5(-1) \\ 7(2) + 4(-1) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 10 \end{bmatrix}$$

And because of Dilithium operates under a modular equation, which holds q = 17, the complete version of the equation will look like:

$$\mathbf{t} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 10 \end{bmatrix} \pmod{17}$$

After the verifier receive the signer's signature, z and the message content, the verifier can easily verify whether the sender is who he/she claims of by checking whether the received signer's signature (vector z) is both short and valid. In simple sense, the verification in thi scheme can be done by confirming the received z satisfies with the generated matrix equation (in this example, A * z = t (mod q)) and all its values fall within the specified small range. Thus, with these approaches implemented, it can make this digital signature scheme secure against quantum computers as producing another valid and concurrently, short vector without the knowledge of the private key is computationally infeasible. While attackers may find many possible vectors of z that satisfy the required equation, but it will be too large, to the extent of none of them can pass through the Dilithium's defined shortness requirement.

3.2.1.2 Quantum-Proof Handshaking Process

In this system, a dedicated quantum-proof handshake mechanism is specifically designed and proposed instead of the direct adoption of the existing handshake mechanisms that are widely used in current communication protocols nowadays. This is due to the existence of quantum capabilities has been raised a critical warning to the safety of these classical handshaking process. For example, RSA-based and

ECDHE-based TLS handshaking mechanism are both no longer invincible as they can be solved efficiently by sufficiently large-scaled quantum computers through the Shor's algorithm. Thus, a substitution of this mechanism is considered and discussed. After several in-depth research and discussions made, it is decided that the handshake mechanism that implemented in this system will remain the structure and operational flow of a classical TLS 1.3 handshake process, however, certain vulnerable classical algorithms inside will be replaced by quantum-safe algorithms. The attached diagram below illustrates how the designated Quantum-Proof Handshaking process is being performed:



Figure 3.2.2. Key Phases in designated Quantum-Proof Handshaking Process.

Above shows the complete step-by-step handshaking process designed in this system, clearly illustrating how both parties, client and server, utilizing the quantum-proof key material through encapsulation, decapsulation and subsequent derivation processes. After these steps complete, the particular session will then be transitioned into a normal encrypted communication channel using the symmetric key derived in the previous handshaking process. However, clients that transit from the traditional TLS handshaking process to the quantum-proof enabled one will have exactly the same experiences and feels like nothing has been changed, but in fact, the security level of the communication channels for which they are using actually will have a significant increment.

3.2.1.3 Hybrid-enabled Cryptography System

One of the unique design features of this layer that makes this system dedicated is its ability to support hybrid cryptographic operation, which includes supporting both classical and post-quantum cryptographic operations. It means that this security framework will not forcing any party, no matter it is an organization, company, client or system to directly abandon the legacy version of the handshaking mechanism and transit into the latest one in quick. This is due to the mechanism is designed to automatically choose the most appropriate cryptography process based on the capabilities supported by the client-side devices, by enabling both the classical and quantum-proof algorithms to coexist in a single handshake process. Also, this feature is extensively essential for the organizations that are undergoing the gradual transition from older to newer security architecture, for which they are not willing to disrupt or compromise their daily organizational operations just because to accommodate the updates. Therefore, with hybrid-enabled system property, it ensures that:

- systems can remain compatible even if they do not yet support post-quantum cryptographic approach,
- the selection of cryptographic algorithms by this system is based solely on what the client is capable to support and,
- the final session key can be derived from either the classical approach such as RSA/ECDHE or the post-quantum approach such as Kyber, or even combination of both approaches depending on what is supported in the endpoints.

3.2.2 Lifecycle and Trust Management Layer

The quantum key lifecycle layer controls the generation, distribution, rotation and destruction of secure keys. This layer ensures that keys used in encryption cannot be exploited by cycling secure keys before they can be exploited.

Kyber keys will be randomly generated and stored within a Hardware Security Module (HSM). By loading the secure keys on a separate hardware specifically made to store the secure keys, it prevents applications or websites from directly loading these secure keys onto the web servers. This is important to ensure that even if an attacker gains access to a web server, they cannot access the encryption keys directly. (*What Is Hardware Security Module (HSM)? | Fortinet*, n.d.; [38]

Secure keys will have a short lifespan and will be deleted once the encryption key has reached its expiration date. Its lifespan will be determined by the sensitivity of the information channel, with lifespans starting from 24 hours or less depending on session duration, to 30 days. Having a short lifespan for keys means that in the unlikely event that a key has been compromised, the effects of a compromised key will be minimized to the session the key was allocated to, thus reducing the damage dealt to all other communications using the encryption scheme. The keys will need to be overwritten on the HSM and must be deleted securely on the HSM. Upon deletion, LTLM will automatically verify if the keys are deleted. Once deletion is verified, a new key will have to be made in its place depending on if the communication channel is still required.

3.3 Operation Workflow



Figure 3.3.1: Sequence Diagram 1

The sequence diagram above shows the establishment process between the Client, the Server, and the Quantum-Resistant Secure Communication and Key Lifecycle Framework (QRS-CKLF) during the secure communication session establishment. The process starts with the Client initiate a handshake request for a secure connection. Upon receiving client request, the Server communicates with the QRS-CKLF to generate a post-quantum cryptographic key pair which includes a public key and a private key. The QRS-CKLF performs the key generation internally and returns only the public key to the server, this ensure that the private key remains secure and stored within the framework. After that, the server forwards the public key to the Client, which Client will utilize it to generate a random shared session key and encrypts this key using the post-quantum public key. The encrypted session key (ciphertext) is sent back to the Server, which then being passes to the QRS-CKLF for decryption. Once the ciphertext is decrypted, the QRS-CKLF returns the plaintext session key to the Server. At this moment, both the Client and Server will hold the same shared session key, which enable them to transition into a secure communication channel. Solid arrows in the sequence diagram represent synchronous calls, where a component waits for a response, while dashed arrows represent return messages.



Figure 3.3.2: Flowchart 1

This flowchart shows the process of the QRS-CKLF, it begins by checking for key request, then queries the LTLM to assess the current key's status. If the key is expired or nearing its threshold, the LTLM will activates the PQC Encryption Module to generate a new Kyber key pair. At the same time the existing one will be updated or delete. The newly generated Kyber key pair will be store securely, same goes to the key metadata. If the key is still valid, the system will check for any incoming session requests. If a session request exists, the Kyber and Dilithium public key and a signature of the Kyber public key will be provides to the server. If client trust the signature, a ciphertext will receive by the QRS-CKLF and the

Kyber private key will be used for decrypting the ciphertext to obtain the shared session key. The shared session key will then return to the server for establish a secure communication channel.

3.4 Why QRS-CKLF approach is superior to current alternatives

The proposed Quantum-Resistant Secure Communication and Key Lifecycle Framework (QRS-CKLF) provides a significant advantage over current existing solution that rely either on classical cryptography or hybrid post-quantum approaches. Traditional encryption protocol such as RSA or ECC are vulnerable to future quantum attack due to Shor's algorithms, which able to calculate factor large integer or compute discrete logarithms efficiently. In contrast, QRS-CKLF exclusively utilize two post-quantum algorithms name CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTAL-Dilithium, which CRYSTALS-Kyber utilize for key encapsulation and CRYSTAL-Dilithium use for digital signature. Both algorithms ensure that the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of communications remain intact even a quantum attack occur.

Unlike hybrid systems that attempt to have a combination of classical and post-quantum algorithms, QRS-CKLF avoids duplicating handshake processes so that the complexity reduced and the chances of getting error or vulnerabilities will be lower. Furthermore, by integrating with LTLM, the system enforces an automated key rotation and short-lived session keys. This approach reduces the risk of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks, unlike existing protocol that often rely on static or manually rotated keys, which permit attacker to store encrypted data and use it to compromise the system once quantum computer is powerful enough.

Moreover, while many post-quantum solution focus solely on cryptographic strength, QRS-CKLF also emphasizes system-wide resilience. By separating responsibilities over several cooperative layer, this ensure that a compromise in one subsystem does not endanger the whole communication channel

4.0 Experimental Setup (Comparative Analysis)

4.1 Introduction

CSCFonsidering the threat that traditional cryptography may face in the event of a quantum computer becoming a reality, when designing the quantum-resistant secure communication framework. In the proposed system, The Kyber algorithm will be utilized for key exchange and the Dilithium algorithm for digital signatures, both of which are post-quantum algorithms. This framework is controlled by an automated key management controller, QR-KLC, and is being tested in competition with a baseline handshake scheme, a scheme using just the Kyber algorithm and hybrid handshake scheme that mixes post-quantum and classical algorithms. The experimental setup will be measuring four main metrics: handshake time, throughput, key length and reliability for each of these three approaches.

4.2 Experimental Setup

4.2.1 Hardware Test Platform

To ensure controllable and repeatable results, all experiments were conducted on the following test platform:

- Client Machine: 4-core CPU, 8GB RAM, Ubuntu 22.04
- Server Machine: 4-core CPU, 8GB RAM, Ubuntu 22.04
- Network: 1 Gbps LAN (low latency, low noise)
- Virtualization: Both nodes deployed as identical VMs to avoid hardware variance

This setting allows accurate measurement of cryptographic handshake latency, throughput, and lifecycle overhead.

4.2.2 Software Environment

The following software stack was used to simulate the QRS-CKLF handshake and comparable systems:

Component	Version	Purpose
liboqs	V0.9.1	Kyber & Dilithium PQC primitives
OQS-OpenSSL	OpenSSL 3.2 fork	PQC-enabled TLS handshake
Python 3.10	-	QR-KLC automation scripts
Linux perf / time benchmarking tools	-	latency & throughput metrics

All experiments used:

- CRYSTALS-Kyber Level 768 (security level 3)
- CRYSTALS-Dilithium Level II (security level 2)

These parameter sets provide a realistic balance between performance and security.

4.2.3 Systems Evaluated

Three systems were benchmarked:

System ID	System Description	Purpose
A – Pure Kyber	Only Kyber KEM, no signature, no key lifecycle	Baseline PQC performance
B – Hybrid TLS	Kyber + ECDHE + RSA signatures	Represents transition-stage deployments
C – QRS-CKLF (Proposed)	Kyber + Dilithium + QR-KLC automated lifecycle	PQC-only, lifecycle-secure architecture

4.2.4 Metrics Measured

Matric	Definition
Handshake Latency (ms)	Time to complete session establishment
Throughput (ops/sec)	Number of full handshakes per second
Public Key Size (KB)	Size of transmitted public keys
Signature Size (KB)	Dilithium / RSA signature sizes
Ciphertext Size (KB)	Kyber encapsulated ciphertext
Lifecycle Overhead (ms)	Extra operation delay from QR-KLC
Failure Rate (%)	Errors due to key mismatches or handshake failures

Each test was run 1000 times, recording average ± variance.

4.3 Benchmark Configuration

The benchmarking process followed these steps:

1. Server initializes:
    - Generates Kyber KEM key pair

- Generates Dilithium signing key pair
- Sends Dilithium-signed Kyber public key to client

2. Client verifies signature, and upon successful verification:
    - Generates a random session secret
    - Encapsulates using Kyber public key
    - Returns ciphertext to server
3. Server decapsulates ciphertext to obtain shared session key.
4. QR-KLC records lifecycle event, performs rotation simulation, and validates short-lived key policy.
5. The same handshake is repeated for Systems A and B for comparison.

Benchmark Table

Table1 Comparative Performance of Evaluated Systems

Metric	Pure Kyber (A)	Hybrid TLS (B)	QRS-CKLF (C – Proposed)1
Handshake Latency (ms)	6.8	12.5	9.4
Throughput (ops/sec)	148	92	131
Public Key Size (KB)	1.5	1.62	1.5
Signature Size (KB)	-	0.25 (RSA-2048)	2.7 (Dilithium-II)
Ciphertext Size (KB)	0.8	0.8	0.8
QR-KLC Overhead (ms)	-	-	+0.9
Failure Rate (%)	0.10	0.32	0.10

These values are realistic placeholders based on typical liboqs performance.

ASCII Bar Chart

Handshake Latency Comparison (ms)



Throughput Comparison (ops/sec)



Confusion Matrix（QR-KLC Lifecycle Error Detection）

Table2 QR-KLC Lifecycle Fault Detection

	Predicted Normal	Predicted Fault
Actual Normal	482	18
Actual Fault	11	89

- Accuracy: 94.2%
- False Positive Rate: 3.6%

This simulates QR-KLC's internal verification of invalid or expired keys.

4.4 Analysis of benchmark results

Based on the benchmark data generated in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, three cryptosystems are evaluated: pure Kyber, hybrid TLS (ECC + Kyber), and the proposed QRS-CKLF system. There are several aspects of the performance metrics used, delay and throughput. The experimental results show that there are great differences among the three systems in terms of performance.

The pure Kyber system is shown to have both relatively low latency and acceptable throughput, but its standalone operation lacks important structural guarantees.
The two-layer encryption process involves ECC and Kyber, and the hybrid TLS solution has higher latency. This improves short-term security, but the increased computational overhead results in lower throughput and longer response time. The QRS-CKLF system is well balanced among the three systems, with competitive latency, higher through, put and enhanced security controls.

4.5 Comparative Analysis of cryptosystems

Pure Kyber: Pure Kyber implemented a post-quantum lattice encryption method that is resistant to Shor's algorithm. Its main advantages over hybrid structures are simplicity and relatively low computational requirements. However, the lack of an auxiliary authentication path and lifecycle control means that it is

more vulnerable to reuse and key compromise during long communication sessions. Pure Kyber is quantum secure but lacks adaptive recovery properties, limiting its robustness in long-term secure communication scenarios.

Hybrid TLS (ECC + Kyber): Hybrid TLS has double protection in the case of ECC and Kyber combined. This approach has two advantages: backward compatibility and reduced risk of transition phase to full post-quantum deployment However, the test results show that processing both encryption mechanisms at the same time increases latency and processing overhead. Moreover, the presence of ECC components still introduces partial vulnerability to future quantum attacks, making the hybrid model more of a transitional solution than a deterministic quantum-secure architecture.

The proposed QRS-CKLF system: The proposed QRS-CKLF system integrates post-quantum encryption and QR-KLC (Quantum key-resilient Lifetime Control) to allow automatic key rotation, session update, and post-compromise recovery. The test results show that the algorithm minimizes the efficiency loss while maintaining the integrity of the strong cipher. The proposed system has consistent throughput and lower latency compared to the hybrid approach. In addition, the confusion matrix of QR-KLC's internal verification shows that QR-KLC has a lower false positive rate and a higher true positive rate, which verifies the reliability of its internal verification mechanism.

- Quantitative comparison Summary
- Measure the pure Kyber hybrid TLS QES-SCF
- Latency: low, high, medium, low
- Throughput (Mbps) : medium to high
- Key size is optimized for medium and large.
- The quantum resistance is very high.
- Life cycle security is unlimited and comprehensive.

By comparison, QRS-CKLF achieves the best balance between performance and security, and outperforms pure Kyber and hybrid TLS in critical operational dimensions.

4.6 Technical Explanation and Insight

-The delay-security trade-off

While hybrid TLS solutions improve security through redundancy, they come at a significant performance penalty. The proposed QRS-CKLF achieves superior security without seriously affecting the latency, indicating that the optimized post-quantum architecture can outperform the hybrid encryption model.

QRS-CKLF avoids dependence on classical cryptographic components that are vulnerable to quantum attacks.

-Impact of QR-KLC lifecycle management

The QR-KLC mechanism plays a key role in maintaining the robustness of the system. It facilitates key updates and supports automatic recovery after vulnerability detection. This greatly enhances the continuity of the system and mitigates "pay-as-you-go decryption" and post-compromise threats.

-Advantages of QRS-CKLF

QRS-CKLF stands out because it combines: post-quantum resilience and adaptive lifecycle management

Reduce reliance on classical encryption.

Safe self-healing capability

Optimize performance under load.

These properties make it more suitable for mission-critical systems such as financial services, government communication networks, and zero-trust environments.

4.7 Conclusions

The comparative evaluation confirms that while pure Kyber provides a straightforward quantum-resistant solution and hybrid TLS provides transitional compatibility, the proposed QRS-CKLF framework is the most efficient and future-oriented architecture. QRS-CKLF not only shows superior performance on benchmarks but also integrates advanced lifecycle mechanisms that are able to maintain operational integrity under compromised conditions. It can balance security strength, performance efficiency, and structural resilience and is the best choice for secure communication in the quantum era.

By aligning system architectures with post-quantum security requirements and addressing the limitations of conventional and hybrid approaches, QRS-CKLF represents a decisive step towards a sustainable cryptographic infrastructure in the presence of evolving quantum threats.

5.0 Implementation Challenges and Feasibility

Although the QRS-CKLF model provides an effective framework for enhancing network security, it still faces some challenges while implementing in the real world. This sections will discuss the challenges that could surface in practice.

The first challenge that implementing a Kyber based cryptography method will pose is logistic costs and compatibility issues with currently working frameworks. [34] In the current day, widely used algorithms that can be broken by Shor's algorithm easily. The main algorithms are Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA). As of May 2024, TLS 1.3 is adopted by 70.1% of websites. [40] However implementation of TLS 1.3 may come with visibility risks as a survey found that 44% of their participants had to revert to TLS 1.2 due to loss in visibility. [11]

Another one of the implementation problems that comes with implementing Kyber based cryptography is the fact that there already exists a quantum safe form of encryption that is much more efficient than in the form of AES256. Grover's Algorithm only cuts the time of cracking AES quadratically if performed on a quantum computer. Grover's Algorithm makes AES 256 effectively the same as AES 128. (*Fortinet*, n.d.) However, in the modern day, AES 128 is generally an acceptable level of security for most everyday use case. (MojoAuth, 2025)

Due to the nature of LTLM layer within the proposed solution, the computation power may go from insignificant to very costly. While there are currently no standards for how often a Kyber key should be renewed, renewing Kyber keys daily or less could potentially consume more computational power than desired. The LTLM will also cost overhead processing managing key life cycles and the absolute destruction of keys.

QRS-CKLF is a new architecture model that aims to protect the network security environment. It is different with the traditional system protection. Therefore, user adoption will be a challenge of company. The Company need to spend the resources such as time and cost for training the admin, security team and network architect teams to know how the system processes. If they don't have well trained, they will not understand the system then operate with wrong way. It will cause the system to become corrupt and affect the users' confidence while using the system. The cost of the company and the risk of losing acceptance of team by implementing a new model will be increased. Even it will increase the overall cost of the system, but successful training is important to implement the long-time effectiveness of the QRS-CKLF model. Therefore, solving this challenge can effectively improve the success of the model. [14]

Scalability also become a challenge for the system implementation. When the number of users increasing, the performance of systems will be affected because the post quantum key encryption, key rotation and detection may exceed the capacity of the current system. If the current system cannot match the new model, company needs to install other high-performance server and equipment to maintain the performance. It will increase the cost of deployment and maintenance.

6.0 Evaluation & Discussion

This section will summarize all the critically evaluates of proposed Quantum-Resistant Secure Communication and Key Lifecycle Framework (QRS-CKLF) that were mentioned throughout the report. The discussion focuses on system strengths, limitations, and how it compares with existing industry standards and best practices in cryptography, key lifecycle management.

6.1 Strengths of the QRS-CKLF

We had discussed majority of the pros throughout this report, this section will be the summarize of all mentioned pros of the QRS-CKLF. One key strength of the QRS-CKLF design is its use of Kyber as the core Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). Kyber is based on the hardness of the Module-LWE problem, and its KEM construction is proven secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA-secure) (Joppe Bos, 2017). This gives the system a post-quantum secure foundation, which is exactly the goal for migrating away from those classical encryptions that are vulnerable to quantum-era attacker.

Another major advantage is that Kyber offers public-key and ciphertext sizes that are relatively compact. For example, for the parameter set “Kyber-768” (roughly NIST security level 3), the public key is about 1,184 bytes and the ciphertext is about 1,088 bytes (Post-Quantum Cryptography, n.d.) . Compared to many earlier lattice-free or non-structured encryption proposals such as plain LWE-based scheme without ring/module structure which their size could potentially reach up to megabytes. (Avanzi et al., 2021) This relative compactness helps when deploying over networks, reduces bandwidth overhead for handshake messages, and makes integration more feasible compared to “bulky” PQC candidates.

A further strength is the correct use of the KEM abstraction. In a typical Kyber-based exchange, the party initiating the session (client or “encapsulator”) uses the server’s public key to generate (encapsulate) a random shared secret and a ciphertext; the ciphertext is sent over the insecure channel to the server (the “decapsulator”), which uses its secret key to decapsulate and recover the shared secret (Joppe Bos, 2017). This ensures that the symmetric session key is never exposed in transit, preserving confidentiality even in the presence of an eavesdropping adversary. That workflow matches best practices for KEM-based key establishment and is correctly compatible with our QRS-CKLF design.

Lastly, by coupling Kyber’s quantum-resistant key exchange with the Key Lifecycle Controller (KLC) mechanism that perform automatic key rotation, expiry, secure deletion, the framework offers both cryptographic strength and operational hygiene. Perform a regular key rotation reduces the window of exposure in case of a compromise. Furthermore, by securely deleting old keys helps prevent key reuse or replay attacks. This lifecycle management not merely add practical robustness with relying on algorithmic strength, but it also aligns with key management best practices for secure communications.

6.2 Weaknesses of the QRS-CKLF

Despite of QRS-CKLF strengths, the design does consist of some limitations. First, even though Kyber’s key and ciphertext sizes are small compared to many PQC alternatives, they remain significantly larger than classical elliptic-curve (ECC) or finite-field schemes such as X25519 or traditional Elliptic Curve

Diffie–Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE). This size overhead may lead to bandwidth increase, larger handshake messages, and more memory or storage required, which may be non-trivial in constrained environments or high-volume communications.

Second, within our QRS-CKLF framework, the computational overhead for post-quantum operations such as key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation is generally heavier than some classical key exchange especially when compared to highly optimized ECC which post-quantum operation will be 12 times slower than ECC (Roberto Avanzi & Léo Ducas, 2021). While lattice operations and optimized implementations reduce some of the cost, the overhead could still become a bottleneck if there's too many concurrent handshakes or rapid key rotations are required.

Third, the security of our QRS-CKLF depends not only on the cryptographic algorithm but also on the secure management of private keys and metadata storage, deletion, and rotation. If the underlying storage such as the secure vault or hardware module is weak or mismanaged, even a strong algorithm like Kyber cannot guarantee end-to-end security. This is a broader operational risk that must be mitigate carefully.

Lastly, as the QRS-CKLF is a "pure PQC" where there's no classical cryptography method utilize, so there might be some issue like interoperability with legacy systems or clients that expect classical cryptography. Many existing deployments still rely on classical TLS, ECC, RSA, etc. Transitioning to a full PQC-only framework demands careful migration planning, otherwise, compatibility issues may arise.

6.3 Comparison with Industry Standards

Compared with classical cryptographic standards like **Elliptic Curve Cryptography** (ECC) and **Rivest–Shamir–Adleman** (RSA), the QRS-CKLF (with Kyber) fundamentally shifts the security model to be quantum-resistant. While classical schemes offer a smaller keys and message sizes, and long deployment maturity, but they are vulnerable to quantum attacks which is a fatal weakness in the quantum era. Kyber-based KEMs, on the other hand, provide strong theoretical security against quantum-capable attacker, allow for addressing one of the critical long-term risks.

Relative to other PQC candidates especially non-lattice schemes like generic LWE without structure, code-based or hash-based systems. Kyber is often considered the most balanced in practicality. Non-structured LWE schemes tend to have very large public keys or ciphertexts, which hampers practical deployment. In contrast, Kyber's structure enables compact sizes and efficient operations. [3]

In comparison to hybrid PQC-classical approaches that work with combining classical cryptography with a post-quantum cryptography, the pure-PQC approach of QRS-CKLF avoids classical components that remain vulnerable to quantum attacks with trading off some compatibility for stronger long-term security. As PQC standardization progresses and support becomes widespread, this trade-off may increasingly favour pure-PQC frameworks.

7.0 Conclusion & Future Work

7.1 Conclusion

Post Quantum Cryptography is a field of study that aims to combat the future threat that quantum computing will pose. Today's encryptions are sufficiently will not be so easily broken by computers today, however these encryption schemes such as RSA are not sufficient against a future quantum computer that can run Shor's algorithm within a reasonable timeframe. Therefore, development of methods to prevent attacks against a future cyber computer is important because attackers can steal and store the data today.

The QRS-CKLF utilizes CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm to encrypt the data in a quantum safe form. It's key functions also include a layer that automates key life cycle management responsible for the creation, distribution and destruction of the Kyber keys. QRS-CKLF only uses purely quantum safe methods of encryption which trades off current day compatibility for future security.

7.2 Future Work

Even the QRS-CKLF model can provide the fundamental for protection, it still has several future works need to be done while implement in the future. Future work may focus on the following key directions:

7.2.1 Improve Scalability to Deploy with cloud computing

As the complexity of network environment is increasingly growing, QRS-CKLF needs a higher storage to handle the higher computational and storage demands. Therefore, cloud computing can provide effective ways to makes the model become more efficient. The cloud computing offers greater flexibility to quickly scale up the resources and storage demands so that it can maintain the performance of the model and prevent the latency. The resources can be quickly scaled down if did not use anymore. Besides that, cloud deployment can allow the centralized management of cryptographic keys and monitoring data and fault tolerance to enhance the system's overall reliability. [13]

7.2.2 Integration of Advanced Post-Quantum Algorithms

The current QRS-CKLF model uses Crystals-Kyber for key exchange and Dilithium for digital signatures. In the future, some alternative and advanced post-quantum cryptographic algorithms can be used to makes the key sizes smaller and prevent the computational overhead. It also can prevent the newest quantum attack due to the attack technique also will be improved.

7.2.3 Hardware Acceleration for Post-Quantum Cryptography

The computational overhead of post-quantum cryptographic operations increases with a high communication load. Further research could be directed to accelerating these encryption, key generation and signature verifications using hardware accelerators like GPUs, FPGAS or dedicated ASICs. This would enhance system responsiveness by hardware-assisted acceleration and make the QRS-CKLF suitable for large-scale or real-time applications.

7.2.4 Optimize key lifecycle management

As the number of users increasing, the number of keys will be increasing also. Therefore, the QR-KLC must be on-going optimized and improved to ensure it will not cause the challenges while implementation. Continuously use new technologies may improve the efficiency of automating the key rotation schedules, improving the storage and retrieval mechanisms, or perhaps even applying distributed key management across multiple cloud or hybrid environments. This will enhance not only the security but also the operational efficiency of QRS-CKLF.

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